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Scope of the factsheet 
This factsheet is mainly focused on three difference classes of decision analysis based on prior 
information, additional information and unknown information, i.e. prior analysis, posterior analysis 
and pre-posterior analysis respectively. Pre-posterior analysis is considered in more detail and the 
Value of Information (VoI) is defined. 
 
Abstract 
The ultimate task of an engineer consists of developing a consistent decision procedure for the 
planning, design, construction and use and management of a project. Moreover, the utility over the 
entire lifetime of the project should be maximized, considering requirements with respect to safety 
of individuals and the environment as specified in regulations. Due to the fact that the information 
with respect to design parameters is usually incomplete or uncertain, decisions are made under 
uncertainty. In order to cope with this, Bayesian statistical decision theory can be used to incorporate 
objective as well as subjective information (e.g. engineering judgement). In this factsheet, the 
decision tree is presented and answers are given for questions on how new data can be combined 
with prior probabilities that have been assigned, and whether it is beneficial or not to collect more 
information before the final decision is made. Decision making based on prior analysis and posterior 
analysis is briefly explained. Pre-posterior analysis is considered in more detail and the Value of 
Information (VoI) is defined. 
Basis / theory / methods 
Decision tree 
The decision process consists of choosing an action ai out of a set of possible actions
{ }naaa ...,,, 21=A . The consequence of implementing an action ai depends on a number of 
uncertain conditions or events out of the set { }mqq ...,,1=θ , which in the context of Structural Health 
Monitoring (SHM) represent the states of the structure. Moreover, the decision maker may have an 
option to carry out an experiment/inspection ej out of the set of possible experiments/inspections 
{ }keee ...,,, 21=E  in order to obtain additional information on the state of the structure, i.e., θ. 
Potential outcomes of these experiments/inspections constitute the set { }lzzz ...,,, 21=Z    Thus, in 
general, the decision problem in the context of SHM can be described in the following terms within 
the framework of Bayesian decision theory (Raiffa and Schlaifer,1961): 
 
A: the set of possible maintenance actions (e.g., do nothing, repair, replace, etc.);   
 
θ: the set of structural states, representing different levels of structural damage, which are usually 
time-dependent; 
 
Z: the set inspection outcomes, which provide information on the actual structural state;  
 
E: the set of possible inspection actions (e.g., inspection date, type of inspection, location, etc.).  
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The combination of certain inspection and maintenance actions, inspection outcome and structural 
state results in a ‘value’, ‘use’ or ‘utility’ u(e,z,a,q), which is a numerical (most often monetary) 
measure that corresponds with the procedure that has been followed. This framework is represented 
in a ‘decision tree’ as for example illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Decision tree 
 
Decisions based on prior information : prior analysis 
Prior analysis is referred to a situation when decision is to be made based on previously available, 
often generic, information. Using this prior information probabilities are assigned to possible 
structural states/conditions. These assigned probabilities are called prior probabilities and 
designated as ]¢ jP q[ . After setting utilities of possible action-state combinations, u(ai,qj), the 
expected utilities corresponding to the different actions can be calculated. The decision tree 
corresponding to this analysis is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Reduced decision tree 
 
The expected utility of action ai is given by 
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where E’θ denotes the expectation operation with respect to prior probabilities P’[θ]. Consequently, 
the decision analysis consists of choosing the action, a*, which results in the largest expected utility, 
u*, i.e., 
 ( )[ ]qq ,'max* auEu
a
=    (2) 
or 
 ( )[ ]qq ,'maxarg* auEa
a
=    (3) 
Decisions based on additional information: posterior analysis 
Posterior analysis corresponds to a situation when new information about the structural state 
becomes available from an inspection but a decision whether to carry out this inspection is not 
included in the decision process. Using the new information the prior probabilities assigned to the 
different structural states/conditions can be updated. These updated or posterior probabilities will be 
denoted as P”[θ|z]. In the case of an experiment/inspection outcome of zk the posterior probability 
can found using Bayes’ theorem as  
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where P[zk|θi] is the likelihood function of the experiment outcome zk. This formula can also be written 
as 
 
         ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
÷
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
ç
è
æ
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
=
÷÷
÷
÷
÷
ø
ö
çç
ç
ç
ç
è
æ
i
i
i
θ
θ
θ
of
yprobabilitprior 
on based outcome
experment   of
 likelihood
constant
gnormalizin
outcome
experiment given
a on basedof
yprobabilitposterior 
              (5) 
The normalizing constant is needed in order to make sure that 0≤P”[θ|z]≤1. New and old/prior 
information are incorporated through the product of P [zk|θi] and P’[θ]. The likelihood function of the 
experiment outcome can be interpreted as the relative probabilities of the different conditions qi 
considering a given observation zk. In case the relative probability is larger for qi compared to another 
condition, then P”[θi|zk]>P’[θi] and vice versa.  
 
Once the posterior probabilities are determined, the decision making procedure is similar to that 
explained in the previous section except that the expectation operation is now with respect to the 
posterior probabilities P”[θ|z], i.e., 
 
 ( )[ ]qq ,"max |* auEu z
a
=    (6) 
or 
 ( )[ ]qq ,"maxarg |* auEa z
a
=    (7) 
Decisions based on “unknown information”: pre-posterior analysis 
Pre-posterior analysis involves both a decision on inspection, e, and a decision on action, a, and the 
corresponding decision process is presented by the decision tree in Figure 1. There are two forms 
of pre-posterior analysis: extensive form and normal form. In the extensive form the analysis is 
carried out backward, i.e., from the right end of the decision tree to its starting point on the left hand 
side. Initially, it is assumed that the selected experiment/inspection and its outcome, i.e., (e,z), are 
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known. Based on the ‘known’ outcome, the posterior probabilities P”[θ|z] can be estimated using 
Eq. (4). Then, for the considered (e,z) the maximum utility can be found as it has been done in the 
previous section 
( ) ( )[ ]qq ,,,"max, |* azeuEzeu z
a
=        (8) 
The difference is that the experiment/inspection decision, e, is yet to be done and its outcome, z, is 
a random variable. To resolve this problem u*(e,z) needs to be calculated for each possible 
combination (e,z) and then expected values of the utility should be found for each possible 
experiment/inspection action. For the latter, the probabilities of experiment outcomes z for a given e, 
P[z|e], need to be defined. For an experiment ei the expected utility then can be obtained as 
( )[ ] ( ) [ ]å
=
=
l
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| |,,        (9) 
The experiment e* that leads to the maximum expected utility u* can then be selected 
( )[ ][ ]qq ,,,"maxmax ||* azeuEEu z
a
ez
e
=                           (10) 
or 
( )[ ][ ]qq ,,,"maxargmaxarg ||* azeuEEe z
a
ez
e
=               (11) 
 
The normal form of analysis progresses forward from the start of the decision tree to its end on the 
right hand side. The analysis starts with the determination of a decision rule, d, which assigns the 
optimal action a to each possible outcome z of every experiment/inspection action in E, i.e., a=d(e,z). 
The expected value of utility is then to be found for each combination (e,d). For that the same 
probabilities that have been used in the posterior analysis (Section 3), i.e., prior probabilities P’[θ] 
and likelihood functions P[z|θ], need to be defined. The only difference is that the likelihood functions 
now depend on a particular experiment/inspection action and therefore will be denoted as P[z|θ,e]. 
The expected utility for a combination (e,d) can then be expressed as 
    ( ) ( )[ ][ ]qqq ,,,', ,| dzeuEEdeu ez=                (12) 
The optimal combination (e,d) is the one that leads to the maximum expected utility 
( )[ ][ ]qqq ,,,'maxmax ,|* dzeuEEu ez
de
=                (13) 
The extensive and normal forms of analysis should lead to the same result (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 
1961). The normal form of analysis may be convenient for risk/reliability based inspection and 
maintenance planning as demonstrated, e.g., in (Faber, 1997). In the context of VoI for SHM it may 
be more convenient to use the extensive formulation.  
Value of information (VoI) 
One of the main applications of pre-posterior analysis is the evaluation of worth of information. In the 
context of the extensive form of analysis for each (e,z) the maximum expected utility u*(e,z) is 
calculated by Eq. (8). The difference between this utility and the maximum utility obtained by prior 
analysis, Eq. (2), represents the value of the information z (Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961). In general, 
the expected VoI can be found as the difference between the maximum utility obtained in pre-
posterior analysis, Eq. (10) or Eq. (13), which will be denoted as u*1, and the maximum utility 
obtained using only prior information, Eq. (2), which will be denoted as u*0 
  
*
0
*
1 uuVoI -=                                    (14) 
Since u*1 takes into account uncertainty associated with experiments/inspections (i.e., sample data), 
which prevents perfect identification of the true state/condition q of a structure, the VoI given by Eq. 
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(14) is also called the Expected Value of Sample Information (EVSI). The VoI calculated after a 
particular experiment has been performed and its outcome is known is called the Conditional Value 
of Sample Information (CVSI). If to assume that an experiment yields exact or perfect information 
that enables to determine the true state/condition of the structure, the VoI before and after the 
experiments are called Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI) and Conditional Value of 
Perfect Information (CVPI), respectively. They provide upper bounds for the EVSI and CVSI. The 
VoI analysis is valid when the utility of any (e,z,a,θ) can be presented as the sum of the sampling 
utility us(e,z) (i.e., utility associated with experiments/inspection and obtained data) and the terminal 
utility ut(a,θ) (i.e., utility associated with terminal action and state/condition of the structure) (Raiffa 
and Schlaifer, 1961) 
    ( ) ( ) ( )qq ,,,,, auzeuazeu ts +=              (15) 
In the context of the VoI in Structural Health Monitoring (SHM), the term ‘utility’ is often replaced by 
the life-cycle benefit, B (e.g., Faber and Thöns 2014). In this case Eq. (14) is expressed as 
   01 BBVoI -=            (16) 
where B0 is the maximum expected life-cycle benefit without SHM estimated by a prior analysis and 
B1 the maximum expected life-cycle benefit with SHM estimated by a pre-posterior analysis. 
Application areas 
The main applications of Bayesian decision analysis are for optimizing the collection of information 
which leads to a better decision. In the civil engineering field, it is the basis for the computation of 
the VoI for optimizing inspections and structural health monitoring in deteriorating structures, (Faber 
and Thöns, 2014), (Straub and Faber, 2006), (Barone and Frangopol, 2013). Similar application 
were made in the field of transportation infrastructure management (Samer, 1993), geotechnical 
engineering (Zhang et al., 2009) and in the field of natural hazards (Bensi et al., 2011), (Garrè and 
Friis-Hansen, 2013). It is and has been applied in many other fields of engineering and science as 
well, including oil exploration (Demirmen, 1996), and environmental health risk management (Yokota 
and Thompson, 2004). 
Critical appraisal 
The posterior and pre-posterior analysis take into account the uncertainties during the decision 
making process in the framework of Bayesian statistical decision theory, thus enable a well-
considered and structured way for making optimal decisions under uncertainty. However, it requires 
significant computational efforts and statistical modelling which sometimes can be cumbersome in 
case one wants to apply this methodology to practical engineering applications. 
Leading research communities / leading application sectors 
DTU Civil Engineering, Technical University of Denmark, Copenhagen, Denmark 
Engineering Risk Analysis Group, Technische Universität München 
Engineering Research Center for Advanced Technology for Large Structural Systems, Lehigh Univ. 
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